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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over 94 million Americans live in coastal counties.1  Despite the 
coast’s scenic views and salty charm, more and more people will flee the 
coast as sea levels rise, the sea engulfs their property, and the cost of 
maintaining their ocean-view homes becomes too high.2  Those who can 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Seton Hall University School of Law.  Many thanks to my advisor, 
Professor Angela Carmella, for her patience, guidance, and wisdom throughout this process.  
I would like to thank my family for always cheering me on.  And to Andrew Adams, thank 
you for your unwavering support and confidence in me, especially over these last three 
years – it feels wonderful to have you by my side.  1 Darryl T. Cohen, 60 Million Live in the 
Path of Hurricanes, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, Aug. 6, 2018, 
https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2018/08/coastal-county-population-rises.html. 
 2  Jesse M. Keenan et al., Climate Gentrification: From Theory to Empiricism in 
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afford to escape rising sea levels and the accompanying floods will flock to 
high ground, forcing out those who can no longer afford to stay.3  This is 
known as “climate gentrification,” where those escaping the sea gentrify 
inland areas and displace long-term residents, usually minorities or 
members of impoverished communities.4 
This comment discusses three types of policies commonly 
implemented by municipalities to combat climate change and rising sea 
levels—protection, accommodation, and retreat policies—and explores 
how they will contribute to climate gentrification.  In reviewing these 
policies, this comment offers solutions to combat the displacement of 
residents on the mainland as more coastal residents flee the rising sea 
levels.  At this time, only studies in Miami and its surrounding area have 
covered the concept of climate gentrification.5  This comment, however, 
focuses on climate gentrification as a national phenomenon, and considers 
general policy proposals to illustrate how those policies affect this concept. 
Part II of this comment provides a brief history of climate change and 
sea level rise, introduces climate gentrification, and explains how these two 
concepts are related.  Part III explores the three types of climate change 
mitigation policies, their effectiveness in protecting property owners by the 
sea, and how those policies could affect gentrification inland.  Part IV 
proposes a pragmatic solution that keeps the interests of both the coastal 
property owners and mainland dwellers in mind.  This comment only 
targets the legal implications of “climate gentrification,” how to best 
combat those effects to prevent displacement, and how property owners on 
both the coasts and dry land can conceptualize its potential effects in the 
near future as the law adapts to climate change.  Gentrification arguments, 
for or against, are beyond the scope of this comment. 
II. THE STORM IS BREWING: THE BEGINNINGS OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
CLIMATE GENTRIFICATION 
A. An Increase in Climate Change Patterns 
Hurricane Michael in 2018, equipped with “unprecedented strength,” 
took sixteen lives, destroyed hundreds of homes, erased utilities for weeks, 
and brought with it a toxic algal bloom in the Florida Panhandle.6  Michael 
 
Miami-Dade County, Florida, 13 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 5, at 1 (2008), 
https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/aabb32/meta. 
 3  Id. 
 4  Id.  
 5  Id.   
 6  Michael’s Death Toll Jumps as Crews Search for Survivors, CBS NEWS, Oct. 12, 
2018,  
 https://www.cbsnews.com/live-news/hurricane-michael-damage-florida-flooding-georgia-
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was the first Category 4 hurricane to hit the Panhandle region, one of only 
four hurricanes to hit the Panhandle in the last fifty years, and the strongest 
hurricane to hit the continental U.S. in over twenty years.7  Hurricane 
Harvey in 2017 was nearly as destructive, if not more destructive than 
Michael, accompanied by orders of evacuation and a path of destruction 
still being repaired to this day.8  Hurricanes Sandy in 2012, notorious 
Katrina in 2005, and Irma in 2017 also hold the title as some of the 
deadliest and costliest hurricanes to hit the United States.9  While shocking 
and disturbing, these superstorms are becoming a norm as analysts predict 
this will be an expected pattern each year.10  Scientists attribute these 
monster hurricanes to the worsening effects of a rising global 
temperature.11 
Climate change researchers are watching the potential for hurricane 
numbers, duration, and strength to rise as a result of rising ocean 
temperatures.12  Warmer temperatures act as a power source for hurricanes 
as warmer air can hold more moisture leading to more rainfall, and warmer 
water allows the storm to draw energy from the ocean water, thereby 
intensifying winds.13  This further suggests that this increase in temperature 
correlates with rising destructive superstorm activity.14 
Certain negative externalities accompany an increase in hurricanes, 
such as toxic algal production and flash floods.  Hurricane Michael’s dump 
of a toxic algal bloom deposited a dangerous red tide phenomenon which 
occurs more frequently each year.15  Toxic algae kill massive amounts of 
 
power-outage-weather-deaths-today-live-updates. 
 7  Brandon Miller & Brandon Griggs, Michael is the Strongest Hurricane to Hit the 
Continental US Since Andrew, CNN, Oct. 11, 2018, 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/09/weather/hurricane-michael-stats-superlatives-wxc-
trnd/index.html. 
 8  Chris Huber et al., 2017 Hurricane Harvey: Facts, FAQs, and How to Help, WORLD 
VISION, Sept. 7, 2018, https://www.worldvision.org/disaster-relief-news-stories/hurricane-
harvey-facts. 
 9  Costliest U.S. tropical cyclones tables updated, NAT’L HURRICANE CTR., Jan. 26, 
2018, https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/news/UpdatedCostliest.pdf. 
 10  Wei Cui & Luca Caracoglia, Exploring hurricane wind speed along US Atlantic 
coast in warming climate and effects on predictions of structural damage and intervention 
costs, 122 ENG’G STRUCTURES 209, 210 (2016). 
 11  Id. at 210. 
 12  Id.   
 13  Hurricanes and Climate Change, UNIV. CORP. FOR ATMOSPHERIC RESEARCH, 
https://scied.ucar.edu/hurricanes-and-climate-change (last visited Nov. 3, 2019).  
 14  Cui, supra note 10, at 210.   
 15  Gustaff Hallegraeff, Ocean Climate Change, Phytoplankton Community Responses, 
and Harmful Algal Blooms: A Formidable Predictive Challenge, 46 J. OF PHYCOLOGY 220, 
228–29 (2010). 
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marine life and cause respiratory illnesses in humans.16  Flooding is also a 
cause for concern because storm-surges often threaten life and property as 
additional water volume engulfs the mainland.17  These flooding events are 
becoming more catastrophic; by 2080, 100-year flood events are expected 
to change to thirty-year flood events.18  Flooding from Hurricane Sandy 
reached levels that occur roughly every 1,000 years, but by the end of this 
century such a storm could occur every twenty years.19 
Perhaps the most concerning effect, at least for purposes of this 
comment, is the rising sea level.  The sea level has risen about seven inches 
over the past century due to oceanic expansion from warmer temperatures, 
glacier melt, and ice sheet melt.20  Three of the nine highest recorded water 
levels in the New York Harbor region have occurred since 2010, and eight 
of the largest twenty have occurred since 1990.21  As the sea level rises, 
coastal storms will push the sea to levels and areas never before seen in 
human history, creating record high flood levels more and more frequently 
along the coast.22  The rising sea level will not only flood its surroundings, 
but also erode shorelines and will likely displace entire coastal 
communities.23  This leaves vulnerable the ninety-four million people who 
reside in coastal properties in the U.S.24 
B. The Start of Climate-Caused Gentrification 
Jesse Keenan, a Harvard scholar who studies residential patterns in 
Miami and other coastal regions, predicts that climate change will greatly 
influence the residential market in areas of high elevation.25  He has coined 
the term “climate gentrification” to denote middle-to-upper income 
residents leaving in Miami Beach and other similar places prone to 
nuisance flooding in favor of higher elevation, which in turn raises the 
price of property in those areas.26 
 
 
 16  Michael’s death toll jumps, supra note 6.  
 17  Claire Weisz et al., Design Meets Science in a Changing Climate: A Case for 
Regional Thinking to Address Urban Coastal Resilience, 82 SOC. RES. 839, 839 (Fall 2015).   
 18  Id.   
 19  Michael Oppenheimer, Adapting to Climate Change: Rising Sea Levels, Limiting 
Risks, 82 SOC. RES. 673, 677 (Fall 2015). 
 20  Id. at 675.  
 21  Weisz, supra note 17, at 839.  
 22  Oppenheimer, supra note 19, at 677.   
 23  Robin Kundis Craig, A Public Health Perspective on Sea-Level Rise: Starting Points 
for Climate Change Adaptation, 15 WIDENER L. REV. 521, 535 (2010). 
 24  Cohen, supra note 1.  
 25  Keenan, supra note 2, at 2. 
 26  Keenan, supra note 2, at 1. 
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Based on Keenan’s study, there are two “pertinent pathways” by 
which people can be displaced around the coastal regions.27  First, as 
population moves from coastal areas to inland urban areas, those without 
means can be displaced from the urban areas because the inland property 
becomes unaffordable by virtue of its resiliency, that is, its inability to 
flood and risk-adverse development potential.28  Keenan found the rate of 
appreciation for a single-family property in Miami Dade County was 
positively correlated with incremental measures of higher elevation. He 
therefore hypothesized that the cost of living in the inland areas will 
drastically rise as households gradually move from the coastal barrier 
islands to the mainland to avoid flooding.29 
The second pathway hypothesizes that it will become increasingly 
expensive to maintain coastal property, forcing those coastal dwellers to 
higher elevation.30  Keenan posits that coastal dwellers will pay an 
increased cost in property taxes, insurance, repairs, and time from sitting in 
traffic in water-logged streets.31  Those who can no longer bear these costs 
will move inland, thereby displacing some of the existing urban 
population.32  Based on these population displacements, Keenan concludes 
that “[l]and use regulators will be tasked with evaluating the consequences 
of relocation and densification, particularly in higher-elevations.”33  He 
theorizes that to mitigate the influx in population and the accompanying 
chance of gentrification, inland municipalities should begin an inquiry into 
inclusionary zoning—the creation of affordable housing by governmental 
mandate.34 
Keenan is not the first to provide a framework for mitigating the 
negative effects of climate change.  Since the 1960s, policymakers at the 
state and federal levels began to seriously consider an appropriate response 
to climate change—implementing plans focusing on safety, neighborhoods, 
buildings, structures, and most importantly, residents.35  In 2008, federal 
 
 27  Keenan, supra note 2, at 2–3. 
 28  Keenan, supra note 2, at 2 (The inland urban areas (e.g. Little Haiti in Miami) are 
“less vulnerable to flooding, in part, because of a known reliance on gravitational flows to 
manage water in [Miami-Dade County.] More fundamental to the theory, it describes a 
behavior of moving financial capital to a geography that offers superior risk-adjusted returns 
for accommodating real estate and infrastructure.”).   
 29  Keenan, supra note 2, at 2. 
 30  Keenan, supra note 2, at 3 
 31  Keenan, supra note 2, at 3. 
 32  Keenan, supra note 2, at 3. 
 33  Keenan, supra note 2, at 9. 
 34  Keenan, supra note 2, at 7. 
 35  See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (first enacted in 1955 and continuously 
revised since); California Global Warming Act, Cal Health & Saf Code § 38501 (enacted in 
2006). 
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and state officials warned Congress that the threat of climate change was 
irreversible, and states should receive assistance from the federal 
government to facilitate proper solutions to cope with rising sea levels.36 
III: CITIES IN THE EYE OF THE STORM: THE POLICY RESPONSE 
Three government-sponsored policies commonly used to minimize the 
hazards of climate change are: (1) accommodation policies; (2) protection 
policies; and (3) retreat policies.37  Accommodation policies attempt to 
minimize the damage to buildings from flooding, storm surges, and 
hurricanes.38  These policies aim to minimize the damage to structures 
caused by flooding and storms through costly insurance policies, minimum 
floor elevations on newly constructed buildings, structural bracing, or 
building codes that comport with flood insurance policies.39  These policies 
do exactly as their name suggests, allowing for continuous climate change 
impact without trying to prevent the damage or mitigate the future risk.  
Protection policies take a different approach, defending property against 
the threat of rising sea levels, storm surges, and floods usually through 
sturdy structures like levees or barriers, such as dunes.40  Both 
accommodation and protection policies work to keep property in place and 
usable by residents.  In contrast, retreat policies aim to decrease the hazards 
of sea level rise by prohibiting or removing development from areas 
vulnerable to flooding.41  These policies are analyzed, along with Keenan’s 
proposed solution of inclusionary zoning, to understand the implication 
they may pose on the law and future displacement issues.  Any government 
action against private property will implicate the Takings Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment, which could impede the success of these policies.42  
Furthermore, because of the complexity of these policies and the legal 
challenges they convey, lawmakers may end up wasting time on the 
hurdles they present rather than finding solutions for those on the mainland 
who are at risk of displacement.43 
 
 36  Devon Applegate, The Intersection of the Takings Clause and Rising Sea Levels: 
Justice O’Connor’s Concurrence in Palazzolo Could Prevent Climate Change Chaos, 43 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 511, 512 (2016).  
 37  Id. at 515.  
 38  John R. Nolan, Symposium: Post-Zoning: Alternative Forms of Public Land Use 
Controls: Land Use and Climate Change: Lawyers Negotiating Above Regulation, 78 
BROOK. L. REV. 521, 549 (2013). 
 39  Id.  
 40  Id.   
 41  Id. 
 42  Applegate, supra note 36, at 512.   
 43  Infra notes 64–66.  
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A. How Takings Jurisprudence is Implicated 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects private property 
from government seizure without just compensation.44  The U.S. 
government may take private property under the power of eminent domain, 
so long as the government can prove a “public use” for the land.45  Local 
governments can regulate private property through regulatory schemes like 
building codes and city zones that promote public health, safety, welfare, or 
morals.46  While most regulation requires no government compensation to 
those affected by it, sometimes a regulation destroys the value of private 
property in a way deemed to be a taking.47  In taking private property, the 
government must satisfy the just compensation requirement, ensuring the 
property owner is paid fairly for doing so.48  The Supreme Court has 
frequently held that the market value of property at the time of the taking is 
the best measure for compensation.49 
Land use regulations enacted to protect landowners from climate 
change will inevitably restrict private property development and will be 
subject to takings challenges.50Takings Clause jurisprudence, however, 
“lacks both uniformity and clarity,” and judges will have to answer to 
landowners’ takings challenges as a result of climate change policies, 
ultimately becoming “chaotic.”51 
B. Keenan’s Proposal: Inclusionary Zoning 
Keenan’s solution to climate gentrification is inclusionary zoning.52  
That term refers to a scheme that “requires developers to mitigate the 
adverse effects of non-residential development upon the shortage of 
housing either indirectly, by contributing to an affordable-housing trust 
fund, or directly, by constructing affordable housing.”53  For example, the 
ordinance at issue in Holmdel Builders Association v. Holmdel allowed the 
developer to either build below density requirements or to contribute to a 
trust fund for a percentage of the purchase price of the new units.54  The 
 
 44  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 45  Applegate, supra note 36, at 517.   
 46  See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926); infra note 90.  
 47  See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-16 (1992); see also infra 
notes 108–143.  
 48  See infra notes 77–87.  
 49  See U.S. v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950). 
 50  See Applegate, supra note 36, at 512; see infra notes 87–118 (explaining a 
“regulatory taking”).   
 51  Applegate, supra note 36, at 512.   
 52  Keenan, supra note 2, at 9. 
 53  Holmdel Builders Ass’n v. Holmdel, 583 A.2d 277, 284 (N.J. 1990).   
 54  Id. at 281–83. 
BONJOUR (DO NOT DELETE) 1/27/2020  12:04 PM 
98 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 44:1 
trust fund was used for the direct benefit to the production of lower income 
units in any given project.55  Other examples of ordinances typically allow 
the developer to allot a percentage of new units for lower income families 
or to contribute to a similar trust fund.56 
The developers in Holmdel challenged the inclusionary ordinance, 
claiming the ordinance was an unconstitutional grant of statutory power, 
which constituted a taking of property.57  The Holmdel court in previous 
years decided S. Burlington County NAACP v. Mt. Laurel (Mt. Laurel II),58 
which imposed an affirmative obligation on every municipality in New 
Jersey to provide affordable housing.  In Holmdel, the court held that the 
inclusionary ordinance at issue served the purpose of providing affordable 
housing within a region and bore a real and substantial relationship to the 
regulation of land use, thereby adhering to the Mt. Laurel doctrine.59  The 
court held there was no unconstitutional grant of statutory power because 
through the Mt. Laurel II decision and New Jersey’s Fair Housing Act, 
each municipality had the power to enact ordinances to further affordable 
housing goals.60  “The fact that defendants sought to accomplish the 
general-welfare goal of affordable housing by development fees rather than 
by mandatory set-asides did not negate a ‘real and substantial relationship’ 
of such development fees to the regulation of land.”61  As for the takings 
claim, the court held that as long as the ordinances were “not confiscatory 
and [did] not result in an inadequate return of investment,” there was no 
injury.62 
In theory, inclusionary zoning considers the finite supply of land and 
ensures the opportunity and means to provide affordable housing.63  In 
practice, however, inclusionary zoning has not proven to be as effective.  
For example, the Florida Legislature enacted the Growth Management Act 
 
 55  Id. at 282–83. 
 56  Id.  
 57  Id. at 280.   
 58  S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Mt. Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983) (The Mount 
Laurel zoning ordinance at issue  allowed for only the kinds of housing affordable to people 
of a higher income.  (“[I]n most places—relatively high-priced, single-family detached 
dwellings on sizeable lots and, in some municipalities, expensive apartments.”)  Plaintiffs 
were low income residents alleging that the zoning ordinances excluded low and moderate-
income families from the town.  The court held that a municipality was required to use land 
use regulations to provide a realistic opportunity for low and moderate income housing.).   
 59  Holmdel, 583 A.2d at 288. 
 60  Id.  
 61  Id. at 286. 
 62  Id. at 293.  
 63  See id. at 285.; see also Hills Dev. Co. v. Bernards Twp., 510 A.2d 621, 653 (N.J. 
1986); Tocco v. N.J. Council on Affordable Housing, 576 A.2d 328, 329 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1990). 
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(GMA), which required municipalities to take housing supply and 
affordability into account when adopting comprehensive plans for future 
city growth.64  Despite its intentions, the authors of the GMA admit it 
resulted in more “aspirational goal-setting as opposed to realistic 
planning.”65  These goals, policies, and objectives were unrealized and 
were not fully implemented because the municipalities have promulgated 
development regulations that cap permissible development at a density far 
less than the density required to achieve the plan’s goal.66 
Furthermore, inclusionary zoning has been criticized for imposing 
“significant burdens on those who wish to develop their property.”67  
Governments seeking to build new housing for low-income families do so 
assuming that housing needs must primarily be met with new 
construction.68  However, most low-to-moderate-income housing has 
always been provided through “filtering,” a process by which the wealthy 
move into brand new homes, the moderate-income population move into 
older homes, and the low-income population occupy outdated housing.69  
Revenues raised from taxing new construction could instead be spent by an 
inclusionary government program to assist low-income families in 
purchasing already-existing housing units.70 
 To summarize, it is perhaps the case that Keenan’s suggestion of 
implementing more inclusionary zoning policies is not the best solution to 
limit displacement caused by climate gentrification.  As discussed below, 
each policy proposed to assist in climate change mitigation also presents its 
own set of legal challenges.71  The best solution is to tie inclusionary 
zoning into the climate change policies to introduce a new idea of 
transferable development rights (TDRs), discussed in Part IV.72 
 
 
 
 64  J. Michael Marshall & Mark A. Rothenberg, An Analysis of Affordable/Work Force 
Housing Initiatives and Their Legality in the State of Florida Part I, 82 FLA. B.J. 79, 80 
(2008). 
 65  Id.  
 66  Id. (No Florida statutes could be found nor case law discussing the success or failure 
or legality of inclusionary ordinances in Florida).   
 67  Home Builders Ass’n of N. California v. City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr.2d 60, 64 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2001).   
 68  Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of “Inclusionary” Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1167, 
1185 (1981). 
 69  Id. at 1184–85. 
 70  Id. at 1202. 
 71  Infra, notes 73–148.  
 72  Infra, notes 156–176.  
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C. Protection Policies 
Protection policies are those which focus on defending individual 
buildings and sites from flooding and shore erosion to combat climate 
change effects.73  This includes building dunes, levees, floodwalls, tidal 
barriers, or barrier islands.74  To build protectionist measures, local 
governments, and the federal government can take an easement from 
private property through eminent domain.75  In addition, the government 
may also take the entirety of a private property through eminent domain, 
discussed below as a form of retreat.76 
Determining “just compensation” under eminent domain 
jurisprudence is confusing and presents an obstacle to effectively 
implementing protection policies.  Consider a protective dune or wall on 
someone’s private property built by the government to save the property; 
how much economic value and practical use did the government usurp by 
stripping a family of thirty feet of beach access or twenty-two feet of beach 
visibility?  Is it possible the government added value to the home by doing 
so, considering this protective dune will add at least fifty years of life to the 
property?  This issue of just compensation under similar facts arose in 
Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan.77 
In Harvey Cedars, the Borough condemned a portion of the Karan 
family’s property to replace an existing smaller dune with a larger dune.78  
The new dune was part of a larger shore-protection project designed to 
protect all residents of the Borough from “the destructive fury of the 
ocean,” but it resulted in the Karans losing part of their view of the beach.79  
The court determined that the Karans were entitled to just compensation 
under the New Jersey and United States Constitutions, but the question 
remained on how to properly calculate just compensation, given that the 
Karans’ property value was both lessened and enhanced by the dune.80 
Just compensation should be based on benefits that are “capable of 
reasonable calculation at the time of the taking.”81  Benefits which are 
speculative should not be considered in a just compensation analysis.82  
 
 73  Applegate, supra note 36, at 515.   
 74  Applegate, supra note 36, at 515.   
 75  See Joshua Ulan Galperin, Raisins and Resilience: Elaborating Horne’s 
Compensation Analysis with an Eye to Coastal Climate Change Adaptation, 35 STAN. 
ENVTL. L.J. 3, 6–8 (2016).  
 76  See infra, notes 89–130.  
 77  Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524 (N.J. 2013). 
 78  Id. at 527. 
 79  Id. at 527–28. 
 80  Id. at 526–27.   
 81  Id. at 540. 
 82  Id. 
BONJOUR (DO NOT DELETE) 1/27/2020  12:04 PM 
2020] FLOODING THE CITIES 101 
Benefits that both sellers and buyers agree enhance the value of the 
property, however, should be considered in the determination, whether they 
are “special or general.”83  The court failed to define either “special” or 
“general,” saying those labels have outlived their usefulness.84  The court 
agreed with the Borough’s argument that the Karans’ newfound ability to 
stay on their property greatly increased the value of the home, thus the 
court remanded the case for the jury to determine what the value of the 
protection was.85  The court declared the fair market value of the property 
to be the standard required in just compensation cases, but the 
determination of fair market value was ultimately a question for the jury.86  
Subsequently, the Karans and the Borough settled for one dollar.87 
This uncertainty of value determinations could disadvantage littoral 
property owners because their expectations for the price of their property 
would be left to jury members—lay persons who lack expertise in such 
calculations.  The before and after market approach likely results in little 
compensation, just like in Harvey Cedars, as the government would likely 
argue the thirty years of protection from the dune, albeit a taking, adds 
value.  It is likely there will be an influx of compensation challenges in the 
near future, if governments turn to protectionist measures and take from 
private property to protect them.88  These protectionist policies are only 
delaying the inevitable, because eventually the water will become 
impossible to hold back.  Littoral property owners will eventually have to 
move from their coastal homes, leaving the problem of displacement to 
repeat itself. 
D. Retreat Policies 
Retreat policies attempt to reduce the hazards of sea levels rising by 
restricting, prohibiting, or removing development altogether from areas at 
risk of being destroyed by flooding.89  These policies force populations out 
of their homes either through  the acquisition of the entire property by 
eminent domain, or by prohibiting land development via land use 
 
 83  Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524, 540 (N.J. 2013). 
 84  Id. at 540. 
 85  Id. at 529, 541–44. 
 86  Id. at 543 (“We can only ensure that every person will receive just compensation, as 
promised by our State and Federal Constitutions. Using fair market value as the benchmark 
is the best method to achieve that result.”).   
 87  Brittany Harrison, The Compensation Conundrum in Partial Takings Cases and the 
Consequences of Borough of Harvey Cedars, 2015 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 31, 36–37 
n.37 (2015) (citation omitted). 
 88  See infra, pp. 18–19.   
 89  Applegate, supra note 36, at 515.   
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regulations.90  Retreating is generally deemed impossible by local 
governments because it is “politically unpopular and expensive,” especially 
when it is done through an eminent domain taking of already-developed 
properties.91  Although unpopular, retreating has slowly crept into city 
planning in urban and rural areas through zoning ordinances; these 
ordinances are considered to be a more proactive approach of climate 
change policies that prevent flood disasters.92 
While some coastal dwellers choose to retreat without government 
intervention due to high costs of maintaining their coastal property, or 
because they become disillusioned by competing with the sea, more often 
retreat occurs from direct land use regulations enacted to encourage 
retreat.93  Typical regulations to ward off the rising sea level include 
prohibitions against residential use, setting parcel bulk restrictions, and 
prohibitions of any further development on the property.94  By declining 
further development or residential use, the city exercises its police powers 
to protect public health, safety, and welfare, which changes with the needs 
of time.95  Zoning regulations are generally held valid in recognition of 
those police powers.96 
In a regulatory taking, the government regulates land use, but it does 
so to the point at which the owner loses all beneficial use of the property.97  
Regulatory takings should not be confused with eminent domain—the 
difference being that the government explicitly takes property by eminent 
domain for a specific public purpose.98  A regulation is not a taking if it 
destroys the utility of one portion of the land as long as the entire land as a 
 
 90  Land use regulation is controlled primarily through zoning ordinances to control and 
direct the development of property.  Zoning controls the height, use, bulk, and density of 
buildings.  Use zones typically control if the building will be used for industry, residence, or 
other purposes.  Height zones control limits and maximums for airspace and stories of a 
building.  Bulk controls the lot’s size, normally the lot’s percentage of occupation.  Density 
establishes population limits on the lot, by controlling how many people can occupy the 
space based on square feet.  Cities should deny zoning ordinances which request 
“upzoning,” or increasing allowable uses or developments on land near water, because these 
areas are at risk for flooding.  “Downzoning,” or reducing the number of allowable uses, is 
more appropriate for at-risk areas in recognition of the city’s police power. See JULIAN 
CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER, ET AL., LAND USE PLANNING AND DEV. REGULATION LAW 65, 4th 
ed. (2018). 
 91  Debbie M. Chizewer and A. Dan Tarlock, New Challenges for Urban Areas Facing 
Flood Risks, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1739, 1756 (2013). 
 92  Id.  
 93  Alice Kaswan, Climate Change Adaptation and Land Use: Exploring the Federal 
Role, 47 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 509, 515 (2013) 
 94  JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 90, at 65. 
 95  Murphy, Inc. v. Westport, 40 A.2d 177, 180 (Conn. 1944) (citation omitted). 
 96  Id.  
 97  See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-19 (1992) (citation omitted).  
 98  See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).   
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whole remains valuable.99Retreat policies may be challenged as regulatory 
takings if the ordinance deprives the land of all economically beneficial 
use.100  In such a case, the government will have to answer to a regulatory 
takings challenge and might have to pay just compensation if the action is 
found to be a taking.101 
In a seminal regulatory takings challenge, Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, a landowner paid nearly one million dollars for two 
residential lots on an island that was subsequently regulated by the 
municipality to ban any permanent habitability structures from being 
built.102  Lucas contended that the ban was an unconstitutional regulatory 
taking, even though the government did not take the land for its own use, 
because it had prevented Lucas from using the land in its entirety.103  South 
Carolina insisted that the regulation was enacted to protect the land from 
harmful and noxious uses, which the Court had seemingly always allowed 
a government to do within its police powers.104  South Carolina argued that 
Lucas’s development would be a nuisance because the construction would 
contribute to the erosion of the island, furthering the public harm.105  The 
Supreme Court held that, notwithstanding the regulation, if an ordinance 
deprives land of all economically beneficial use, the government may resist 
compensation only if the inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate 
shows that the proscribed uses were not part of the title to begin with.106  
Particularly, if the state can prove that its nuisance law would have 
enjoined the development, then a regulation that prevents the development 
does not constitute a regulatory taking—even if it leaves the property 
valueless.107 
The Court used examples to describe regulatory takings that would 
not entitle a landowner to just compensation: a lakebed owner who was 
denied a permit to participate in a landfill operation would not be entitled to 
compensation if the effect would flood others’ land;108  a nuclear generating 
plant owner would not be entitled to compensation for removing all of the 
land improvements if the plant sat on an earthquake fault.109  Both of these 
regulations eliminate all economic productive use for the landowners.  
 
 99  See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-19 (1992) 
 100  Id.   
 101  Id.   
 102  Id. at 1006-07.   
 103  Id. at 1009. 
 104  Id. at 1022. 
 105  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027. 
 106  Id. at 1022. 
 107  Id.  
 108  Id.   
 109  Id. 
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However, the use of these properties for the now-prohibited purposes was 
already unlawful, the regulations did not prohibit a productive use that was 
previously permissible under existing nuisance principles.110 
The inquiry into nuisances entails an analysis of the degree of harm to 
public lands and resources, degree of harm to adjacent private properties, 
the social value of the claimant’s activities and their suitability to the 
locality in question, and the relative ease with which the alleged harm can 
be avoided through measures taken by the claimant and government 
alike.111  The Court remanded Lucas, and stated that, in order for South 
Carolina to succeed, it “must identify background principles of nuisance 
and property law that prohibit the uses” Lucas intended in the 
circumstances in which the property was presently found.112  “Only on this 
showing can the State fairly claim that, in proscribing such beneficial uses, 
the [land use regulation] is taking nothing.”113 
Lucas may be one of few land-owner-friendly regulation cases.114  
This presents a seemingly new question, that is, if regulations were enacted 
to protect the landowner against harmful or dangerous property, would they 
too be struck down?115  If a regulation prevented a landowner from building 
not to protect the land as a historical site or open space, but to prevent the 
landowner from any physical or financial harm due to impending floods or 
storms, would that regulation be upheld to protect against an existing 
 
 110  Id. at 1029–30.  
 111  Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030–32 (1992). 
 112  Id. at 1031. 
 113  Id. at 1032.   
 114  Infra notes 117–121.  
 115  Additionally, if these regulations did protect the landowner from the dangers of 
flooding, but did not strip the land of all economic value, how would the courts rule?  It is 
likely the courts would reject these claims brought by a landowner.  For example, in Maine, 
a regulation restricted permits for a limited time to harvest timber on certain woodlands for 
the purpose of protecting wildlife.  A harvesting company brought suit, claiming the 
regulation constituted a taking as it rendered the land “useless” and was an unreasonable 
exercise of Maine’s police power in violation of due process.  The court rejected these 
claims.  The harvesting company asserted that the value of the land as timberland has been 
destroyed, hence the value of the land for any purposes was zero; however, the court in 
rejecting that assertion stated there were other purposes for the land besides harvesting 
timber.  The court held there is no place for expectations of future profits except to the 
extent those expectations are reflected in present market value, and because the harvesting 
restriction was only temporary, the land wasn’t technically useless.  As for the due process 
claim, the court stated the requirements of due process in the exercise of police powers 
separated into three elements: (1) the object of the exercise must be to provide for the public 
welfare; (2) the legislative means employed must be appropriate to the achievement of the 
ends sought; and (3) the manner of exercising the power must not be unduly arbitrary or 
capricious.  The court held the first two requirements were equally satisfied in that 
protecting wildlife was a valid object and controlled cutting clearly furthered a legitimate 
and signification public purpose.  Seven Islands Land Co. v. Maine Land Use Regulation 
Com., 450 A.2d 475, 482–483 (Me. 1982). 
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nuisance?  Or would it be struck down as in Lucas as stripping the 
landowner of the value of his property? 
Land use law and flood ordinance jurisprudence suggest “that the 
prevention of risky flood plain development, even if partially done for 
parental reasons, is a valid police power objective” and would withstand a 
landowner’s takings challenge.116  Under Lucas, if a new development 
causes flooding on surrounding parcels, that constitutes a nuisance.  A 
regulation that prevents such construction, then, would not be a regulatory 
taking even if it led to a total loss in value because the development was a 
nuisance to begin with. 
“Courts have rejected many Fifth Amendment challenges to flood 
plain ordinances.”117  Courts have only held regulations pertaining to flood 
plain zoning invalid “in a few of the more than 125 appellate state and 
federal cases addressing floodplain regulations over the last decade,” 
including those that challenge the regulation as a taking of private 
property.118  In Beverly Bank v. Illinois Department of Transportation, the 
court held that the Illinois legislature had the authority to prohibit the 
construction of new residences in the 100-year floodway and that a taking 
claim was premature.119  In State of Wisconsin v. Outagamie County Board 
of Adjustment, the court held that a variance for a replacement of fishing 
cottage in the floodway of a river was barred by a valid zoning 
ordinance.120  In yet another case, a court rejected a claim that the rezoning 
of a 150-acre golf course from residential to strictly recreational use was a 
taking because the property was important for floodwater storage.121 
As sea levels rise, regulatory takings challenges will likely increase as 
local governments strive to find the best solution to protect their citizens.122  
Because the courts have routinely held that restricted zoning to protect 
citizens, wildlife, or for preservation purposes all fall within a city’s police 
powers, it is likely that restricting coastal living will be deemed lawful and 
appropriate to further a city’s safety scheme.123  Retreat policies, which 
 
 116  Chizewer, supra note 91, at 1760–61.  
 117  Chizewer, supra note 91, at 1761. 
 118  Chizewer, supra note 91, at n. 122.   
 119  Beverly Bank v. Ill. DOT, 579 N.E.2d 815, 822–23 (Ill. 1991). 
 120  Wisconsin v. Outagamie Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 532 N.W.2d 147, 147 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1995). 
 121  Bonnie Briar Syndicate, Inc. v. Town of Mamaroneck, 721 N.E.2d 971, 976 (N.Y. 
1999). 
 122  See Michael Allan Wolf, Article and Essay: The Brooding Omnipresence of 
Regulatory Takings: Urban Origins and Effects, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1835, 1843 (2013). 
 123  See Murphy, Inc. v. Westport, 40 A.2d 177, 180–81 (Conn. 1944); Lauridsen 
Family, L.P. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Greenwich, 2018 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1452, at 
*14 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jul. 12, 2018); Lee Cty. v. Morales, 557 So. 2d 652, 655 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1990).  Also consider how the Court expanded the public use definition so easily 
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focus on keeping the population safe and are constitutional, only exacerbate 
the effects of climate gentrification.  As a result of retreat policies, people 
may be increasingly forced out of their homes and obligated to find homes 
on the mainland, rushing displacement and not allowing time for any 
solutions to form. 
As for retreat policies that would take an entire property through 
eminent domain, the Supreme Court has expanded eminent domain powers 
by interpreting “public use” broadly; thus it is likely these would be 
constitutional takings.124  The Supreme Court ruled in Kelo v. City of New 
London125 that a city could take private property and redistribute it to 
private developers without violating the public use requirement of the 
Constitution’s Fifth Amendment.126  The Court reasoned that “public use” 
also meant anything could fall under the purview of “public purpose,” 
meaning economic revitalization promoted the government’s interest in 
economic development.127  Using Kelo, local governments have justified 
flipping the urban demographic. For example, New York City revitalized 
Harlem and Brooklyn using Kelo’s very principle.128  Kelo led to 
displacement in these instances where the original residents lost their 
housing to those who could pay more money for the new-and-improved 
housing in the same location.129 
Retreating may seem, to coastal residents, as the most unjust form of 
policy.130  Many littoral residents may not want to leave their homes due to 
strong ties to their communities, children, schools, and personal 
attachments.  Moving may no longer be a choice as rising sea levels 
requires moving as the only option for safety,131 but forcing residents out 
without planning for an adjustment on the mainland only worsens the 
effects of climate gentrification. 
 
 
within Kelo. The court could very well expand the state’s police powers in the name of 
safety.   
 124  Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 481–82 (2005). 
 125  Id. at 486. 
 126  Id. at 489.  
 127  Id. at 486.   
 128  David Linhart, Eminent Domain Conversion of Vacant Luxury Condominiums into 
Low-Income Housing, 21 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 129, 138 (2011). 
 129  Id.  
 130  Kaswan, supra note 93, at 514–15.  (“Retreat is the most controversial response to 
climate impacts.  Residents and local governments are loathe to relinquish settled 
neighborhoods.”).  
 131  Id.  (“Increasing risk exposure and the cost and fallibility of protection and 
accommodation measures suggest that, ultimately for some areas, retreat is the only feasible 
and financially affordable option.”). 
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E. Accommodation Policies 
Americans believe that people and businesses most at risk from rising 
sea levels should foot the bill for recovery efforts and not the general public 
or government.132  Despite this sentiment, accommodation policies continue 
to aid those along the coasts.  One of the most problematic accommodation 
policies is the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).133  Enacted in 
1968 as a response to the private insurance market refusing to offer flood 
insurance, the NFIP aimed to insure residents in the zones found on the 
program’s flood maps, showing which areas were high risk or low risk.134 
The NFIP is managed through the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), and participation in NFIP is not required in 
communities.135  The insurance is only available to owners in communities 
that participate in the program by agreeing to enact certain measures to 
help mitigate flood risk; however, the program does not require 
communities to restrict or forbid building in flood-prone areas.136  Flood-
prone areas are found on maps drawn by FEMA.137 The maps are not 
updated regularly, and as sea level rises and floods occur more frequently, 
the maps cannot keep up with the modern change in flood areas or 
predicted changes in flood-prone zones.138 
NFIP is heavily subsidized by taxpayers and $25 billion in debt; it has 
been operating at a loss for over a decade.139  Some homeowners take 
advantage of the program by rebuilding the same $100,000 home over 
nearly two decades of recurring flood damage and super-storm beatings, 
using over a million dollars of insurance resources.140  This ability to 
repeatedly rebuild storm-destroyed homes in the same storm-threatened 
location is not only “uneconomical and inefficient but also could 
significantly interfere with a local government’s [climate change 
strategy.]”141  Despite the interference, some local governments favor 
accommodation policies because compensating victims and promising for a 
 
 132  Chizewer, supra note 91, at 1758. 
 133  Alexander Lemann, Trolling Back the Tide: Toward An Individual Mandate For 
Flood Insurance, 26 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 166, 182-83.  
 134  H. Joseph Coughlin Jr., With National Flood Insurance Program ‘Under Water,’ It’s 
Time to Move to an All Natural-Hazard Plan, ENVTL. DUE DILIGENCE GUIDE (Jun. 12, 
2017). 
 135  Lemann, supra note 133, at 179.  
 136  Lemann, supra note 133, at 179. 
 137  Lemann, supra note 133, at 179. 
 138  Lemann, supra note 133, at 179. 
 139  See Lemann, supra note 133, at 176 and 207.  
 140  Lemann, supra note 133, at 176 and 207. 
 141  Megan M. Herzog & Sean B. Hecht, Combatting Sea Level Rise in Southern 
California: How Local Governments Can Seize Adaptation Opportunities While Minimizing 
Legal Risk, 19 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENV. L. & POL’Y 463, 507 (2013).  
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future change is easier than encouraging people to leave.142 
Furthermore, insurance rates will continue to rise in order to insure the 
properties repeatedly affected by climate change; the higher the rates rise, 
the less likely homeowners will choose to stay.143  Mortgages on properties 
not protected by insurance on the coast are deemed “unsellable” on the 
secondary mortgage market, causing higher mortgage rates for the same 
property in the future.144  This reduces the liquidity of the homes.145  The 
cost of homeownership on the coast becomes nearly impossible to afford 
due to the flood insurance requirement and some policies requiring 
mitigation, which cause the homeowner to bear the cost of flood 
proofing.146 
The wildfires that occurred in California in November of 2018 are 
topical to this discussion.147  These fires destroyed homes and took lives; 
however, homes and lives were saved among those of the richest 
population within Malibu and Paradise through private firefighters and 
access to quick getaways.148  While these fires are outside the scope of this 
article, it is important to note that in all aspects of climate change, those 
who can afford to avoid the risks and protect what is theirs, do, and those 
who cannot afford to, lose. 
F. How Climate Change Policies Influence Climate Gentrification 
Each of the climate change policies discussed above are short-term 
solutions for a long-term problem.  Protection policies, while a robust 
solution for landowners along the coast, are costly measures borne by the 
taxpayers.  These policies could aggravate homeowners who do not want to 
see changes made to their property against their will, like the Karans, and 
force them to flee the area for higher elevation.149  Furthermore, 
homeowners may have an extra twenty years added to the life of their 
 
 142  Chizewer, supra note 91, at 1758. 
 143  Shelby D. Green, Building Resilient Communities in the Wake of Climate Change 
While Keeping Affordable Housing Safe From Sea Changes in Nature and Policy, 54 
WASHBURN L.J. 527, 537-38 (2015). 
 144  Id. at 536–62. The secondary mortgage market is a market in which loan originators 
pool and sell mortgages to purchasers, who in turn sell interests in those mortgages to 
investors as mortgage-backed securities.  Both the markets and homeowners suffer from 
rising insurance premiums.  
 145  Id. at 562.  
 146  Id. at 538.  
 147  Robert Raymond, As California’s Wildfires Raged, The Ultra-Rich Hired Private 
Firefighters, HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 15, 2018, 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/california-wildfires-neoliberalism-climate-
change_us_5bec0d2ce4b0caeec2c012a0. 
 148  Id.  
 149  See e.g. Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524 (N.J. 2013). 
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property, but eventually the sea will engulf their property and they will be 
forced out.150  Protection policies, unaccompanied by a land use regulation 
or other solutions for those already living in the higher elevated areas, will 
only delay the inevitable. 
Retreat policies exacerbate gentrification and displacement.151  
Overregulating municipalities will either drive their property owners out 
due to frustration or force them out as soon as possible with a prohibition 
of use ordinance.152  These policies will create an influx of property owners 
fleeing to the mainland, possibly inundating a community with a population 
for which it was not intended to provide.153As insurance rates rise and 
living near water becomes impossible to afford, accommodation policies 
will push those who can no longer afford coastal property to the mainland, 
which in turn may displace mainland residents.154 
 
IV: HOW TO WEATHER THE STORM 
The rising sea is inevitable, and, as Keenan suggests, climate 
gentrification is bound to happen in more cities than just Miami.155  The 
policy responses enacted by municipalities to combat climate change will 
fail to protect residents inland from coastal residents scooping up their 
property.  Municipalities, then, need a solution that will protect coastal 
landowners’ property interests and protect inland residents.  As discussed 
above, protection, retreat, and accommodation policies will likely 
exacerbate the effects of climate gentrification if enacted individually; 
however, these policies coexist with other land use principles to ensure 
property interests are intact and displacement occurs seldomly. 
A. Amortization as a Solution 
A nonconforming use occurs where a part of a city was zoned for one 
use, and the city later changes that part to allow for a different use.156  The 
use of the property as previously used, thus,  no longer conforms to the new 
zone.157  Nonconforming lots or uses are generally allowed to continue until 
 
 150  Kaswan, supra note 93, at 514–15. (Discussing the increase in risk exposure and the 
cost and fallibility of protection and accommodation measures).  
 151  Linhart, supra note 128, at 138.   
 152  See Chizewer, supra note 91. 
 153  See Chizewer, supra note 91. 
 154  Green, supra note 143, at 537-38. 
 155  Keenan, supra note 2, at 2. 
 156  Cleveland MHC, LLC v. City of Richland, 163 So.3d 284, 285 (Miss. 2015) (where 
a mobile home park in the City of Richland found itself to be in a “Light Industrial” zone).   
 157  Id. (“Thus, a use of the mobile-home park was a nonconforming use.”). 
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they are eventually removed, but the “survival of the nonconformity is not 
encouraged.”158  A nonconforming use may be eliminated “by 
‘amortization,’ that is, requiring its termination over a reasonable period of 
time.”159  Amortization of a nonconforming use allows a prior existing 
development—in this case, residential properties along the coasts—with a 
legal use a set number of years to phase into a non-use.160  Amortization 
provisions are presumed valid and the land owner “must ordinarily show 
that the period is too short” to be able to recover the money invested in the 
property were they to challenge the ordinance.161  Amortization 
accompanied by a fair amount of time is accepted as “obviating the need 
for just compensation.”162  To justify amortization periods, courts weigh the 
benefit to the public against the loss to the landowner.163  Half of all states 
have held amortization provisions as constitutional.164 
Cities should enact amortization periods for coastal properties, 
determinant on a reasonable amount of time, to give the property owners 
enjoyment of their property with notice of why they will be retreating 
within that reasonable amount of time.  A reasonable time period is best 
determined by the court, but to satisfy the just compensation principle, a 
reasonable amount of time could be proposed to be fifty years, or about the 
length of a generation.165  By rezoning a residential zone along the coast to 
 
 158  Id.   
 159  Trip Associates, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 898 A.2d 449, 456 
(Md. 2006).   
 160  Jay M. Zitter, Validity of provisions for amortization of nonconforming uses, 8 
A.L.R. 5th 391, §2[a]; See supra n. 90 for a definition of land use regulatory terms.  See also 
Modjeska Sign Studios, Inc. v. Berle, 43 N.Y.2d 468, 479 (N.Y. 1977) (Describing 
amortization periods as a “middle ground” for landowners.  “By limiting the period during 
which an existing nonconforming use may be continued, a balance is struck between an 
individual’s interest in maintaining the present use of his property and the general welfare of 
the community sought to be advanced by the zoning ordinance.”).   
 161  Jay M. Zitter, Validity of provisions for amortization of nonconforming uses, 8 
A.L.R. 5th 391, §2[b]. 
 162  David A. Super, From The Greenhouse To The Poorhouse: Carbon-Emissions 
Control And The Rules Of Legislative Joinder, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1117 (2010) (citing 
City of Fayetteville v. S & H, Inc., 547 S.W.2d 94, 98 (Ark. 1977) (accepting an 
amortization provision as an acceptable method of eliminating nonconforming use when a 
city is acting pursuant to its police power)). 
 163  Zitter, supra note 160.  
 164  Board of Zoning Appeals v. Leisz, 702 N.E.2d 1026, 1032 (Ind. 1998) (citing Jay M. 
Zitter, Validity of Provisions for Amortization of Nonconforming Uses, 8 A.L.R. 5th 391, 
412-22 (1992) (listing three federal circuits and twenty-four states as supporting the “view 
that amortization provisions are valid if they are reasonable,” and no federal circuits and 
only four states adhering to the “view that all amortization provisions are invalid in 
general”)). 
 165  See 10 Zoning and Land Use Controls § 53C.08 [E] (2019); see also Harris v. Mayor 
and City Council of Baltimore, 371 A.2d 706, 709-12 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977) (holding 
that a court is not restricted in determining constitutional reasonableness of amortization 
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a non-developmental zone, the municipalities would restrict the use of 
property for any reasonable purpose, and these could be challenged through 
the Takings Clause.166  However, the Court concluded that the elimination 
of use within a reasonable amount of time does not amount to the taking of 
property, and, in addition, municipalities would likely succeed based on 
nuisance principles and public safety concerns.167  For consideration, the 
property may very well be taken by the sea within a half-century. 
B. Transferable Development Rights as a Solution 
A transferable development rights (TDRs) program would assist 
municipalities in preparing for the eventual population influx due to 
climate gentrification.  TDR programs are typically implemented in historic 
locations or farm lands, to protect national parks, or in environmentally 
sensitive areas, where building and developing property would be 
problematic to the surrounding land.168  TDRs function by restricting 
development on a parcel of land that would otherwise have development 
potential, known as the sending parcel, and allows properties in the 
receiving area to exceed their zoning density through purchasing the 
development rights of the sending parcel.169  TDRs are also used where 
“adverse impacts [. . .] require particularly severe restrictions in a localized 
area,” the adverse impact here being the rising sea levels.170  TDRs allow 
the transfer of density from sites that would be identified as having a 
preservation status, and giving those undeveloped rights to allow for 
density beyond what is already built in the receiving area.171 
In 2004 New Jersey enacted its own TDR program, the Highlands 
Water Protection and Planning Act (“Highlands Act”) after the State’s 
legislature determined the Highlands area, which provided drinking water 
and farmlands to New Jersey, was being lost to development and suburban 
sprawl.172  The Highlands Act serves to protect nearly 800,000 acres from 
harm by creating two areas within the region: a preservation area (sending 
 
provisions and may also consider the original amortization provision set by the city.) 
 166  Id. (“Amortization has long been a controversial land use regulation technique, as 
owners of nonconforming uses can claim that the removal of a nonconforming use at the 
end of an amortization period, without compensation, is unconstitutional”). 
 167  Nicholas R. Williams, Coastal TDRs and Takings in a Changing Climate, 46 URB. 
LAW. 139 (2014); see also Trip Associates, 898 A.2d at 575 (“So long as [the amortization 
period] provides for a reasonable relationship between the amortization and the nature of the 
nonconforming use, an ordinance prescribing such amortization is not unconstitutional.”).  
 168  Id.  
 169  Id.  
 170  STEWART E. STERK, ET. AL., LAND USE REGULATION 65 (Robert C. Clark, et. al. eds., 
2d ed.  2016). 
 171  Williams, supra note 167.   
 172  N.J. Stat. § 13:20-2 (2004) (findings and declarations relative to the Highlands Act). 
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zone) where development is strictly regulated and the development 
potential can be transferred, and a planning area (receiving zone), in which 
development is encouraged through the purchase of the sent parcels to 
build at a greater density than permitted.173  A landowner who owned 
ninety-three acres within the preservation area challenged the Highlands 
Act.174  He claimed the legislation resulted in a taking of his property.175  
The court disagreed, stating that municipalities within the Highlands area 
had no obligation to accept the designation as receiving zones, and property 
owners who obtained TDR credits had no assurance of being offered a 
particular price for them.176  Therefore, the program was not an 
unconstitutional taking because the Act was a voluntary, market-driven 
scheme that resulted in payment from property developers.177 
The Pinelands Development Credit (PDC) Program is another New 
Jersey TDR program which serves to preserve agriculturally and 
ecologically sensitive land.178  TDR credits are sent from specified 
agricultural zones, and then property owners and developers who are 
interested in developing land in growth areas, the receiving parcels, are 
able to purchase them.179  The Pinelands program typically increases 
residential densities in the designated growth areas, most prominently in 
urban areas, like Camden, New Jersey.180  Once sending credits are 
established in the sending parcel, the property is permanently protected by 
a conservation or agricultural deed restriction, and cannot be developed 
further.181 
C. Land Use Policies Must Coexist to be Successful 
Accommodation, protection, and retreat policies each present a unique 
challenge; no one of these policies is the perfect solution.  Standing alone, 
the policies will exacerbate displacement; but intertwined with different 
regulatory programs, these solutions allow the property owner to continue 
living along the coast without being pushed out by retreat policies, recoup 
their investment in their property, and allow for development and inclusive 
 
 173  Id.  
 174  OFP, L.L.C. v. State, 930 A.2d 442, 445 (N.J. 2007). 
 175  Id. at 450.   
 176  Id. at 452.   
 177  Id.   
 178  Pinelands Development Credit Program, STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 
https://www.nj.gov/pinelands/landuse/perm/pdc/index.shtml (last visited Nov. 15, 2019). 
 179  Id. 
 180  Density Transfer: The Pinelands Experience, STATE OF NEW JERSEY PINELANDS 
COMMISSION, https://www.nj.gov/pinelands/infor/online/density.shtml (last visited Nov. 15, 
2019).  
 181  Pinelands Development Credit Program, supra note 178.  
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programs within the mainland and urban areas to prevent displacement of 
underrepresented populations. 
The best solution to combat displacement on the mainland and to 
avoid government takings is to gradually introduce these policies and allow 
them to coexist as one unique solution.  A TDR program could be enacted 
in a coastal context, where the land is as environmentally sensitive as the 
Highlands and Pinelands are to New Jersey: a beachfront owner would live 
in a designated sending parcel and would be able to sell their development 
rights.  The beachfront owner would still maintain their property under the 
requirement that the use would not involve any construction of new or 
permanent structures. 
While an inclusionary zoning policy would not be successful on its 
own,182 if enacted in connection with a TDR program, the receiving parcels 
could be identified and managed in a way to minimize displacement of 
inland residents.  If the receiving parcels are in the crowded urban areas, 
movement from the coast to the mainland would raise costs of existing 
housing and displace existing inland populations.  The inland receiving 
parcels could be designated intentionally to avoid displacement of inland 
populations through inclusionary zoning. 
Along with a TDR program, municipalities could require a tax on or 
percentage of an accommodation policy, like flood insurance, to be placed 
in a trust to assist lower income families who will be inevitably affected by 
the influx of people moving to the mainland.  The same proposition would 
stand for every protection policy–a new dune or seawall–a percentage of 
the cost to construct could be placed in the trust.  Protection policies and 
retreat policies could be paired with amortization periods, where the 
government could protect the landowner from the rising sea levels, but the 
landowner would have time to recoup the investment and not be forced 
immediately from their homes on the coast. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This comment put forth the challenges of rising sea levels and the 
shortcomings of municipal legislation, which will potentially place both 
coastal property owners and the urban population in a difficult situation.  
These shortcomings have led to the concept of climate gentrification, the 
process by which those who escape coastal living gentrify areas inland and 
cause displacement of long-term residents.  This gentrification happens as a 
result of greater demand for inland properties, which drives up costs and 
makes inland properties less affordable.  Any of the common climate 
change policies that protect the coastal property owners, force them to 
 
 182  Infra, notes 63–70.   
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retreat from the coast, or accommodate future living along the coast all 
only exacerbate climate gentrification. 
This comment argued that to protect the people most at risk of 
displacement, while not harming the beachfront property owners in the 
process, municipalities should gradually introduce land use policies 
together.  A Transferable Development Rights program could be instated to 
incentivize development in the urban areas in ways that mitigate 
displacement and not take property from the beachfront owners.  An 
amortization period may be a proper form of retreat for those on the coasts 
as flooding and sea level rise will eventually overtake their property.  These 
solutions, paired with the accommodation, retreat, and protection policies, 
may be the best way to protect property owners without subjecting 
municipalities to takings challenges. 
 
